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Abstract: The objective of this investigation is to study the role that the narrative speech act plays in relation to the
acquisition of certain types of knowledge within the frame of argumentative processes. An inferential scheme that
regulates the acquisition of knowledge is exposed, as well as an analysis of the reasons adduced. This is used to develop
an evaluative method for the argumentative “goodness” of narrative texts. Finally, the particular case of literary
narratives is analysed.
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1. Introduction
This paper addresses the question of how to analyse the process of acquisition of knowledge by
narratives, when acting as reasons within an argumentation. The first part of the paper (Section 2)
deals with the epistemological background needed in order to fulfil this task. The relations between
narrative and epistemology are studied from the perspective of the knowledge acquired by
testimony and the concept of basic knowledge. The second part of the paper presents an explanation
of the process by which knowledge is acquired in argumentations when narratives are used as
reasons. An inferential scheme is presented in order to systematize this phenomenon. The third part
of the article is about the assessment of the performance of narratives when acting in the course of
an argumentation. The last part of the article deals briefly with the particular case of literary
narratives.
2. Knowledge and narrative
In this section, I will discuss some aspects about the relations between knowledge and narrative. In
order to do so, some epistemological notions and assumptions have to be presented.
People acquire beliefs about the world through belief sources. If these sources are reliable, it
become knowledge sources, from which people can acquire knowledge. The problem of the
criterion (Cohen, 2002), which deals with the problem of the need of a priori knowledge about the
reliability of the source in order to acquire knowledge from it, generates great controversy. The
theoretical commitments I will present later make clear the position I am holding in relation to it.
Once the background is settled, I should like to make several remarks about the nature of the
kinds of knowledge that are susceptible to be acquired from narrative. These kinds of knowledge
partially concicide with the so-called “knowledge by testimony.”
The traditional belief sources considered in epistemology are perception, memory and
induction (Cohen, 2002). Less frequently studied, instrospection is also an accepted one. And the
last one is testimony. It is often—and, in my view, mistakenly— considered as second-rate source,
as it provides second-hand beliefs: those arriving to their destiny through someone else (O’Brien,
2006). However, and this is why I think testimony is a pure first-rate kind of knowledge, it is a very
frequent source of knowledge. Whenever we come to believe facts like Patrick Modiano won a
Nobel Prize—when we hear it on the radio—or that we were born on a shinny morning—when our
mother tells us—we are acquiring beliefs by testimony. We are persistently acquiring knowledge by
testimony, and in some of these cases, testimony is a piece of narrative.
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Despite the role of the epistemology of testimony is not the main one of this paper, some
theoretical commitments about this field have to be made. Firstly, I will face the dichotomy
“testimony as an intentional activity on the part of the speaker […] [versus] testimony as a source
of belief or knowledge for the hearer” (Lackey, 2006, p.187) in favour of the second option. 1
Consequently, I am going to adopt the definition of testimony Jennifer Lackey (2006) calls Hearer
Testimony:
S testifiesh that p by making an act of communication a if and only if H, S’s hearer, reasonably
takes a as conveying the information that p (in part) in virtue of a’s communicative content.
(Lackey, 2006, p.190)
Hearer testimony allows to emphasize the role of the addresee of a communicative act. By
doing so, it makes possible to study the relations between knowledge by testimony, narrative and
argumentation from a perlocutionary point of view, as it will be done in the subsequent sections. As
Lackey states, the illocutionary force with which the addresser loads a testimony as performing its
emission does not make any much difference: “[Testimonyh] can serve as a source of belief or
knowledge for others, regardless of the testifier’s intention to be such an epistemic source”. (p.189)
It is also important to remark that I am referring to what M. Welbourne and C.A.J. Coady
(Welbourne & Coady, 1994) call natural testimony. This expression refers to testimony offered in
daily life circumstances, without any technical or specifical requirements—unlike formal testimony,
which refers to situations like “statements offered under oath in a courtroom or commission of
inquiry”. (p.178) So, in this paper, by testimony I mean hearer, natural testimony.
With respect to narrative, in his Narratology: The Form and Function of Narrative, Gerald
Prince (1982, p. 4) presents the following definition “the representation of at least two real or fictive
events or situations in a time sequence, neither of which presupposes or entails the other”. In this
paper, I will assume Prince’s definition. The alluded representation, in my view, will be made of
certain speech-acts, wether of fiction-making (García-Carpintero, 2016) or non fiction-making
(Romero Álvarez, 1996).
On the ground of the previous remarks, it is easy to identify testimony with non-fiction
narrative. Testimony refers to people making communication—speech—acts in order to convey
some information, while narrative is related with the representation of some events—by
communicative means: speech-acts. In the case of testimony, the addressee takes the addresser as
reasonably conveying some information. If we assume, as it is usually understood, that ‘information’
refers to some data about the real world, the equivalence is assured.
In order to accommodate fiction narrative into this analysis, some additional remarks are
needed. In her article Is there a specific sort of knowledge from fictional works?, M.J. Alcaraz León
(2016) states that there is evidence about the capacity of fiction for conveying knowledge. But, she
defends, there is not anything specifically fictional in the features that enhace this epistemic value:
“if we look at the reasons that […] reinforce the idea that fiction possess cognitive value, none of
them show that the fictional character […] is playing a significant role in the constitution of these
values”. (p.40) She defends that what explain the power of fiction for conveying certain kinds of
knowledge has to do with “the representational means used to prodice a work” (p.40), and that the
common misunderstanding about the epistemic specificity of fiction is based on the historical
effort—in terms of “modulating the expressive and cognitive virtues of each representational
medium” (p.38)—that artists have made in producing fiction.
Based on these observations, it can be stated that, although fiction narrative doesn’t fit into the
paradigm of testimony—unlike non-fiction narrative—, its epistemic values coincide.
1

I am interested in what actually counts as testimony rather on what is intended to do so. According to that, and as my
focus is on written narrative, I choose to follow Gadamer’s hermeneutical spirit. His views about the lack of relevance
that the author’s intentions have in relation with the actual meaning of a text can be condensed in the following quote:
“Not occasionally only, but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author. That is why understanding is not
merely a reproductive, but always a productive attitude as well.” (Gadamer, 1975, p.264)
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Regarding the structural relation between testimony/non-fiction narrative and fiction narrative,
some comments have to be made. The basic idea I endorse was expressed by J.L. Austin (1962) in
relation with the circumstances required for issuing an utterance: “We […] must bear in mind the
possibility of ‘etiolation’ as it occurs when we use speech in acting, fiction and poetry, quotation
and recitation” (p.92).
In this line, M. García-Carpintero (2007, 2016) explains fiction as a kind of speech-act that
fulfills certain conditions. In order to provide a theoretical ground, he presents his account of
assertion—also modelled as an speech-act—, based on the constitutive “Knowledge Transmission
Rule”. According to it, asserting a proposition consists in uttering it in a way such that an intended
audience is put in a position to know that proposition. On its basis, an analogue constitutive rule is
presented, in order to define his account of fiction:
[…] to fiction-make a proposition by uttering something (or painting, or having people acting
on stage, and so forth) is to so utter with the communicative intention to put an intended
audience in a position to make believe (imagine) that proposition. (2007, p.204)
According to that, the point of fictioning is to imagine, that is, to know (or pretend to know, or
acting as if one is knowing) certain things about a possible world, different from the real one. So, it
is reasonable to understand fiction narrative (a narrative about a possible world) as the
representation of a narrative about the real world—that is, the representation of a testimony. In
conclusion, it has been shown that the epistemic values associated to testimonies—non-fiction
narratives—and representations of testimonies—fiction narratives—coincide.
Once narrative has been properly accommodated into the field of epistemology of testimony,
some theoretical commitments have to been made. It will provide some technical insights from
epistemology that will allow me to precise the kind/s of knowledge suitable to be acquired through
narrative.
The first matter about which I am shall to take sides is if knowledge by testimony is inferential
or non-inferential. According to the remarks presented by Daniel O’Brien (2006), there are a
number of non-inferentialist views that I support, although an inferentialist concession has also to
be assumed.
I defend that testimonial knowledge can be acquired in a direct way. An inferential and nonexclusive testimonial chain—or web—justifying a testimony is not a neccesary condition to acquire
knowledge by it.
In consequence, I also support the idea that testimonial knowledge can be a type of basic
knowledge. The notion of basic knowledge I use is the one addressed by O’Brien: “one whose
epistemic credentials do not rely on another (more basic) form of knowledge” (p.6). Other occounts
of basic knowledge, like the one by Stweart Cohen (2002) also fit into the position I am holding:
knowledge provided to an addressee by a belief source, prior that to the knowledge (by the
addressee) that the belief source is reliable and, consequently, is actually a knowledge source.2
In this line, knowledge acquired from testimony constitutes basic knowledge in some specific
situations. The first one happens when a testimony yields knowledge directly, without appealing to
another kinds, like perception, memory, etc. The second one consists in testimonies justified by an
exclusively testimonial inferential chain, which first step is reliable enough to generate knowledge.
And, consequently, so does it the final one.
As I stated before, there is also an inferential-style argument I also admit. Inferential chains of
finite length, composed only by testimonial steps are an existing and valid way to achieve
testimonial knowledge—as I have outlined above. As the inferential jumps that compose this kind
of chains are supported by reasoning processes, this position contradicts genuine non-inferential
views like the following one, presented by O’Brien: “if one does have to admit the ability to reason
thus, such an ability does not play a justificatory role”(p.6).
Basic knowledge according to Cohen’s view is also a type of basic knowledge in O’Brien’s (traditional) view (Cohen,
2006, p. 310).
2
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The last subject from which I consider my position is my view about whether knowledge by
testimony is of an internal or external nature. In order to illustrate my position, let’s consider that
some addressee, A, acquires knowledge, K, from a source, S (an addresser of a testimony), without
A having acquired previously the knowledge KS, about the reliability of the source. An internalist
view would deny the viability of this situation, while an externalist one would accept it (O’Brien,
2006).
I am holding an externalist position, as I don’t think that the addressee’s prior knowledge of K S
is a necessary condition for the her acquisition of K.
Neither is it necessary, for the addresser associated to S, to know KS prior to stating it. What it
is necessary, I defend, is the reliability of the source—its “epistemic quiality” (O’Brien, 2006,
p.8)—in an ontological level. According to this view, acquiring knowledge by testimony seems
rather similar to dying by a shot into the air. Neither the shooter’s intention to facilitate the death
nor the potential victim’s one are necessary conditions for the event, although both of them may
help.
In conclusion, in this chapter narrative has been accomodated into the field of the epistemology
of testimony. Thus, some technical characteristics of knowledge by testimony can be applied to
narrative. Among them, it can be stated that knowledge acquired through narrative is a type of basic
knowledge
3. How is this knowledge acquired?
In this paper, argumentation is understood in the line of Lilian Bermejo-Luque’s Linguistic
Normative Model of Argumentation (2011). According to it, argumentation is modelled as a second
order speech-act complex, composed of the constative speech-act of adducing (i.e., the reason) and
the constative speech-act of concluding (i.e., the conclusion) (Bermejo-Luque, 2011, pp. 60-62).
This speech-act complex presents an illocutionary force, which amounts to trying to show that the
conclusion is correct, and a characteristic perlocutionary effect, that consist on inviting to infer the
conclusion, on the basis of the adduced reasons. In the case when the addresser, by means of her
speech-act of arguing, successes in showing that the conclusion is correct—which requires the
accomplishment of certain semantic and pragmatic conditions (Bermejo-Luque, 2011, pp. 186-194)
—then she is justifying the conclusion.
The relation among the concepts of argument, argumentation, inference and reasoning is the
following: reasonings (mental processes) and argumentations (communicative processes) consist on
inferences that ground the acceptation of some beliefs based on other beliefs. The syntactic and
semantic properties of these inferences are represented by means of arguments.
Bermejo-Luque’s (2011) notion of correctness is the following one:
We will take a claim to be correct if we think of the (ontological or epistemical) qualifier
that represents the type and degree of pragmatic force with which this claim has been put
forward as the one by means of which this claim should have been put forward (p.62)
A claim is correct if its pragmatic force is adjusted with respect to both the real world and an
ideal.3 Despite how interesting the analysis is between the level of correctness of a claim and its
quality with respect to make its addressee acquire some knowledge, it is beyond the scope of this
study. I will only rely on the commonly accepted assumption that the more correct a claim is, the
more accurate is the representation of the world it offers and, consequently, the more knowledge
about the real world it generates.

This meaning is derived from the last part of the definition: “this claim should have been put forward.” The expression
“should have been put forward” makes a reference to an ideal world in which both qualifiers coincide. In this way, this
notion of correctness evaluates the similarity between the pragmatic conditions in which the addresser of a claim puts it
forward and an ideal set of conditions in which it “should” be uttered.
3
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In order to believe a conclusion, the addressee should believe both the reason and the inference
that lead to it. When an arguer wants to show the correctness of her point of view, she has to look
for reasons and inferences that can help her to justify it. If she finds a reason that contributes to this
task but needs additional support, the next thing she should do is to find a new reason that fully
justifies the previous one—and, transitively, the original point of view, or desired conclusion. If it
doesn’t do it completely, the chain will continue growing in length. Each reason constitutes a partial
conclusion whose correctness has to be proved by the next reason to find. The relations between
these steps are hold by the inferences that lead from one to the next.
As infinite-length chains of inferences are not sufficient to achieve evidence abut the
correctness of the original conclusion to prove, there must be a final step, an inference whose
reasons are good enough to stop inferring. This precise step would be the last to be found, but the
first one in relation with the order relationship determined by the direction of the inferential chain.
In argumentative contexts like the one that has been described, narratives can be used as
reasons. They exhibit a great justificatory and persuasive power, which comes from their
effectiveness in making an addressee acquire particular pieces of knowledge or belief. This issue
has been explained in Section 2, in relation with the fact that knowledge by narrative can constitute
a kind of basic knowledge. This means that certain4 pieces of knowledge acquired through narrative
can perform the role of the first step of an inferential chain—although it would be the last one at
being found, as it was mentioned above—, as its epistemic credentials does not depend on any other
kinds of knowledge.
This topic of the “last reason” has been widely discussed in Argumentation Theory literature. In
their The New Rhetoric, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca stated that “Argumentation...must convince
the reader that the reasons adduced are of a compelling character, that they are self-evident” (1969,
p. 32). The “self-evident” characteristic Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca demanded to reasons
coincides with the basic nature of the knowledge achieved by certain narratives. It is evident now
that these particular narratives can become “good reasons.”
To this point, the role of inferential chains should be detailed. The relation between an
argumentative process and an an inferential chain comes from the already discussed one between
argumentation and reasoning. The first one is a communicative process, while the last one is of an
internal nature. Both of them rely on inferences that allow the jump from some beliefs to another
ones. According to this, the mentioned inferential chain, motivated by the utterance of the
characteristic speech-acts of the argumentation, leads a cognitive process: a reasoning. This one
goes from the piece of basic knowledge acquired through the first reason of the chain to the derived
knowledge associated to the conclusion—although not necessarily in a direct way: several steps
may be needed to justify the conclusion.
The expression ‘inferential web’ has also been used, because any of the aforementioned steps is
isolated. All of them are supported by a web of auxiliary inferences—which refers to contexts
(Sperber, 2000), sources, etc. In order to explain this situation, some remarks about direct and
indirect judgements (Bermejo-Luque, 2011, pp.73-75) should be done.
When reviewing all the possible ways of “coming to believe new things” (2011, p.75),
Bermejo-Luque classifies it among direct judgements, indirect judgements and “judgements
prompted by other judgements in a non-inferential way.” Direct judgements correspond to
judgements that have not been yield by any other judgement. The author exemplifies this type has
recalling that empirical knowledge is often derived from direct judgements.
However, she refuses to label this kind of judgement as ‘non-inferential.’ As she states:
In the philosophical literature, this kind of judgment is usually called “non-inferential”;
however I would rather call it “direct” because I would like to leave aside the question of
whether, in the end, a judgment must be inferentially articulated for it to have any content at all.
In fact, I am willing to say that (most, or even, all) direct judgments “depend” upon previous
4

The issue about which narratives are good enough ones when they are working as reasons in argumentative contexts
will be studied in Section 4, appealing to the notion of “good reasons,” by Walter Fisher (1987).
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inferences. …This association is something that probably depends on many inferences had I
already made over time. Yet, despite its inferential articulation and dependency, I say that this
judgment counts as a direct judgment because I didn’t make these inferences in order to judge
in this particular case. (p.74)
The case of inferential webs accommodates into this situation. We could say that the auxiliary
inferences that support the principal steps of an inferential chain correspond to the ones (mentioned
by Bermejo-Luque) that are not made to judge in particular cases—but conform automatic
associations of ideas. As it is stated later, the events that prompt these auxiliary inferences should be
count as causes rather than reasons. As reasons, they should have timeless validity so they could
properly justify the associated inference. As causes, these events are “sufficient to generate a mental
state that did not exist previously” (p.74).
On the contrary, indirect judgements are judgements “caused by other judgment(s) or belief(s)
of the subject that are related to this judgment in an inferential way” (p.75). These judgements
correspond with principal steps of the described inferential webs.
In conclusion, inferential webs present a structure similar to the external one of a leaf. There is
a main inference chain that relates several pieces of knowledge (so-called ‘principal steps’—
according to the leaf model, it correspond to each node to which arrive the auxiliary veins) and that
would play the role of the midrib of a leaf. There are also a set of auxiliary inferences for each
principal step, that relate determined causes with it and that would play the role of the auxiliary
veins of a leaf. The principal steps can also be prompted by other judgements in a non-inferential
way.
It can be noticed that the presented analysis by Bermejo-Luque allude to making judgements
and acquiring beliefs, while this paper deals with the subject of acquiring knowledge through
narrative. So, the relationship between judgement, belief and knowledge has to be precise, as these
three have been said to constitute the principal steps of an inference web. With respect to the
distinction between belief and judgement, Bermejo Luque states that “the difference between a
belief and a judgment as a matter of the difference between an attitude and an act: whereas
believing is having a certain attitude towards a given propositional content, judging would be (the
act of) presenting to ourselves a given propositional content as holding” (pp. 74-75).
To this part, despite the great conceptual difference, it is not difficult no expand an analysis
based on judgements—the one made by Bermejo-Luque—to an analysis based on beliefs.5 It seems
necessary, at least in average cases, to have an attitude prior to make an act. Consequently, the
direct or indirect character of judgements, along with the rest of considerations made with repect to
them, can be applied to beliefs only by stopping the act of “presenting to ourselves a given
propositional content as holding” in the very moment of having the so mentioned attitude about this
same propositional content.
Regarding the application of previous analysis to pieces of knowledge, the already made
theoretical commitment of externalism allows it. The main condition for acquiring knowledge,
according to the setting presented in Section 2, is the ontological reliability of the source, its
“epistemic quality,” (O’Brien 2006) terms. Neither the knowledge by the addressee nor the one by
the addresser, of the reliability of the source is a necessary condition for the acquirement of
knowledge. In consequence, the distance between judgements, beliefs and knowledge does not
constitute a problem in order to apply the analysis carried out with respect to the first two to the last.

5

Neither the author pays too much attention to the specificity of her analysis with respect to beliefs or judgements. She
often expands it to both of them: “Now, let us define “indirect judgment” as a judgment caused by other judgment(s) or belief(s) of the subject that are related to this judgment in an inferential way” (p. 75).
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4. Argumentative goodness of narratives
As it has been outlined, narratives can work as reasons, when adduced within the course of an
argumentation. In this section, an analysis and an assessment system for these narratives will be
developed.
The idea of narratives performing as reasons does not fit in many conceptions of argumentation.
These conceptions share a view of rhetoric as a mere procedimental discipline, which purpose
consist on developing some techniques—mostly heuristic—in the line of persuading specific
addressees within argumentative contexts. Narratives acting as reasons fit in this account as
“rhetorical devices,” improving persuasiveness of argumentations.
There are two different conceptions about the relationship between rhetoric and argumentation.
The classic one focuses in the persuasive capacity of the argumentation itself, and explains the
rhetorical value of any piece of text or discourse in terms of persuasion to particular audiences: it is
a purely instrumental conception of rhetoric, and it has been criticized by authors like Christian
Kock (2009) or Lilian Bermejo-Luque (2011, pp. 158-162), due to the absence of mention and
study of the justificatory character of argumentation.
Another conception of the rhetorical, as it is presented in Bermejo-Luque (2011, pp. 148-157),
defends that the rhetorical properties of any communicative object does not constitute a function of
the effect it provokes on particular subjects, but of what can be considered as a normal or standard
response, coming from a normal or standard audience. In this line, in the course of argumentations,
rhetoric plays a role in justifying points of view rather than merely in persuading particular
addressees. That is to say, rhetoric aspects constitute an essential part of reasoning.
The account that Walter Fisher (1989) presents about the “narrative paradigm” can be inscribed
as one of these last conceptions. As he asserts: “Reasoning need not to be bound to argumentative
prose or to be expressed in clear-cut inferential or implicative structures” (p.57). In this same
direction, he points out further “Rationality is determined by the nature of persons as narrative
beings” (p. 65). That is, according to him, reasoning does not need to be so attached to logic
approaches as it has been traditionally, but to other aspects closer to rhetoric. He focuses in
narratives as the core of his reasoning paradigm, which are defined as follows: “By “narration” I
mean symbolic actions—words and/or deeds—that have sequence and meaning for those who live,
create or interpret them” (p.58).
The narrative paradigm is widely developed and discussed in Fisher’s work, so that I am not
going into present it in detail. Despite that, some details and insights about it should me useful for
the objective of this section. First of all, al last general insight about the narrative paradigm:
Under the narrative paradigm all [people] are seen as possessing equally the logic of
narration—a sense of coherence and fidelity. This is what is implied by the commonplace that
everyone has “common sense” (p.68).
Besides that, it should seem evident that are better and worse narratives when it comes to play a
role in reasoning and/or argumentation processes. The idea that sustains the evaluation of narratives
points to its internal coherence and “truth”. Internal coherence is related to formal features: “the
consistency of the characters and actions, the accommodation of auditors and so on” (Fisher, pp.7576).
The so-called “truth” is a semantic matter, and deals with the relationships that connect a
narrative with the real world. Fisher names it ‘narrative fidelity’: “fidelity to the truths that
humanity shares in regard to reason, justice, veracity, and peaceful ways to resolve social-political
differences” (p. 76). Despite this concept is more allied to moral values, it is similar to Teun van
Dijk’s notion of macrostructure: “In a theory of discourse the notion of macrostructure…is used to
account for the various notions of global meaning, such as topic, theme, or gist. This implies that
macrostructures in discourse are semantic objects” (van Dijk, 1980, p.10).
The main difference lies in that van Dijk refers to the meaning of a narrative, while Fisher’s
definition is about individuated meanings, potentially extractable from the narrative. As he states,
“the principle of fidelity pertains to the individuated components of stories—wether they represent
7

accurate assertions about social reality and thereby constitute good reasons for belief or action”
(Fisher, 1989, p. 105). Interpretation, which is the basis for semantics, is always an action of many
levels. Gadamer’s views on hermeneutics are very close to this issue. In Truth and Method (1975)
he presents an account for explaining the various meanings of a given text. Each meaning extracted
from a given text—through its interpretation—by a given reader is conditioned by the associated
reception conditions: those in which the reader is embodied at the moment of the reading. These
circumstances must present some link with the text in order to allow the interpretation.6 The
reading circumstances (in Gadamer’s terms “the interpretation horizon”) may vary according to
many factors, even for the same reader. In consequence, there is a wide variability of combinations
from which a given interpretation may arise. This variability explains the phenomenon of the
multiplicity of levels of interpretation for a given narrative. Associated to each level of
interpretation there can be defined a set of meanings, extracted from the narrative. This hierarchizes
the relations between argumentations, narratives and internal reasons that sustains the discourse/text
semantics I am dealing with in this paper.
This analysis allows the definition of “reasons” (in Fisher’s terms) associated of a given
narrative. That is, the parts of a narrative which assessment will provide an integral level of fidelity.
According to that, a reason 7 can be defined as an element of the greater set of independent
meanings potentially extractable—by a particular interpretation—from a given narrative.
An important remark is that this account of reason should not be confused with the one that
refers to the reasons provided within the course of an argumentation, which can present, as it has
been discussed, the form of narratives. To avoid that misunderstanding, I will name the reasons I
have just defined as ‘internal reasons.’ When the expression ‘good reasons’—for the sake of
brevity— is used, it will mean ‘good internal reasons.’
The standard that fundaments the evaluation of internal reasons, according to Fisher (1987), is
“good reasons”: “those elements that provide warrants8 for accepting or adhering to the advice
fostered by any form of communication that can be considered rhetorical” (Fisher, 1989, p.107).
Internal reasons associated to the same narrative are interrelated. There might be a set of good
reasons not properly related, so the correspondent narrative does not exhibit an acceptable level of
fidelity. For a given narrative, the first condition for fidelity is that all its reasons are to be good
reasons. The second condition is a proper interrelation among the internal reasons, which is
assessed by the logic of good reasons. Fisher understands logic as “A systematic set of procedures
that will aid in the analysis and assessment of elements of reasoning in rhetorical interactions” (p.
106), and particularizes it in a set of five critical questions (Fisher, 1989, p. 109). A narrative with a
good degree of fidelity should answer properly all of it.
To this point, there is a set of regulative conditions (Searle, 1969) that explains how to assess
narratives acting as reasoning devices. As it was stated in Section 3, reasonings are mental
processes, while argumentations are communicative ones. Both are sustained by inferences.
According to that, in order to achieve the assessment of a narrative acting as a reason in
argumentations, an adaptation of this set of regulative conditions has to be presented—attending to
the communicative character of argumentations.
The first step consists on checking the internal coherence of the narrative, just as Fisher
explains it for reasoning.

As Gadamer states: “In our analysis of the hermeneutical process we saw that to acquire a horizon of interpretation
requires a fusion of horizons. But no text or book speaks if it does not speak a language that reaches the other person.
Thus interpretation must find the right language if it really wants to make the text speak. There cannot, therefore, be any
single interpretation that is correct ‘in itself,’ precisely because every interpretation is concerned with the text” (p. 398).
7
The account of reason provided by Fisher does not seem precise enough (“the individuated components of stories,”
p.105), neither collects all the insights that have been mentioned. This is why I have decided to present my own account
of reason—internal reason—, in the presented context.
8
His account of warrant is “[any piece of communication that] authorizes, sanctions, or justifies belief, attitude, to action”
(p. 107).
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The second step is based on the evaluation of the fidelity. In order to do that, the already
mentioned set of associated internal reasons has to be extracted from the narrative. Once this task
has been fulfilled, the goodness of every internal reason must be tested.
To this point, the interrelation of the internal reasons should also be checked. To do this, an
adaptation of Fisher’s original set of critical question will be used, so that a positive answer has to
be obtained for each question. These are the following.
Logic of argumentative good reasons: a set of inner reasons from a given narrative is adequately
internally organized if the following questions can be satisfactorily answered:
1. Question of fact: What are the implicit and explicit values embedded in an internal reason?
2. Question of relevance: Are the values appropiate to the nature of the decission the internal
reason bears upon?
3. Question of consequence: What would be the effects of adhering to to the values—for one’s
concept of oneself, for one’s behaviour, for one’s relationships […]?
4. Question of consistency: Are the values confirmed or validated in one’s personal experience,
in the lives or statements of others whom one admires and respects […]?
5. Question of transcendent issue: Are the values the message offers those that…constitute the
ideal basis for human conduct?
6. Question of internal coherence: Are the values offered by each internal reason by a
particular narrative compatible among it?
7. Question of sequential coherence: Are the values offered by each internal reason by each
uttered narrative compatible among it?
Questions 1-5 are the same as Fisher’s, only with the ‘internal reasons’ expression marked in
italics replacing ‘message.’ Question 6 and 7 are particular of the presented account, and are
adequately formulated due to the previous definition of internal reason.
Question 6 refers to the local compatibility of all the internal reasons from a given narrative. It
is not specific for argumentations; in my view it should be a necessary condition for an internal
coherence system like the logic of good reasons. It is not deductible from Questions 1-5, and
captures de whole essence of the system. Question 7 refers to the communicative character of
argumentations: coherence among reasons is a necessary condition for a good argumentation, and it
is a consequence—in the case of narratives working as reasons—of coherence among all internal
reasons from all narratives.
A last issue has to be discussed. An argumentatively good narrative is the one that is composed
of good reasons that present logic with good argumentative reasons. It anticipates a good
performance in justification, within an argumentative context. But, does it also make its addressee
to acquire knowledge properly?
This question has been answered in Section 3, by using results about direct and indirect
judgements, inferential webs and chains, and so on. Now, it can be stated that an argumentatively
good narrative provides basic knowledge or, at least, provides knowledge cooperatively along with
the previously adduced narratives—acting as reasons—.
To this point, only a new remark can be added. In this paper, an epistemological externalist
account has been hold. It defends the absence of necessity of knowing the reliability of the source
of a given belief in order to it becomes knowledge. But, despite this absence of necessity, the
knowledge of knowing can also be a matter of study, even for an externalist. And it can be obtained
when the knowledge acquired comes from a narrative: the reliability of the source can be derived
from both internal coherence and fidelity. A narrative presenting good levels of these indicators is
presumably coming from a reliable source, at least it is typically assumed9.
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A justification for this last assertion could provide from an assumption that is often made subconsciously. This is
related to integrity: a person of good narrativity should also be a person of good moral and knowledge.
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5. On literary narratives
Finally, some remarks are presented regarding the singular character literary narratives exhibit in
relation to their power to generate new meanings and, consequently, additional pieces of knowledge.
Literary narratives exhibit a number of specific characteristics. Louis Hjelmslev (1943)
highlights one of them: literary language and, in general, artistic language is not an exclusively
denotative semiotic system but a connotative one. Connotation, in terms of Hjelmslev and Roland
Barthes (1964)—Hjelmslev’s results on connotation were commented and enriched by the latter—is
explained as follows: Artistic language involves both signified and signifier in order to get
additional meanings to the first-order denotative meaning. That is the so-called, by Hjelmslev,
‘connotative semiotics’. In Barthes’ words: “[…] any system of significations comprises a plane of
expression (E) and a plane of content (C)…the signification coincides with the relation (R) of the
two planes: ERC…[in connotative semiotics] the first system (ERC) becomes the plane of
expression, or signifier, of the second system:…(ERC) R C” (Barthes, 1964, p. 90).
Considering the points discussed so far, a deeper set of inner signifier-signified relationships
arise in literary narratives. The denotative sign (ERC) acts as the signifier for the connotative sign
((ERC), R, C) (Gaines, 2012) and, in so doing, it generates an additional meaning for the narrative
text: the second order, connotative one. In this way, additional rhetorical imports may take place
based on literary texts, as they may be based on both the denotative and the connotative levels,
loading the text with a deeper and richer set of perlocutionary meanings (Bermejo-Luque 2011, pp.
148-157). Accordingly, a literary narrative is potentially a source of more pieces of knowledge than
a non-literary one. Alcaraz-León, as it was slightly mentioned in Section 2, also points out in this
direction. She defends that the “cognitive virtues”—i.e., epistemological value—of fiction does not
come from its fictional character, but from the fact that fiction literature has commonly better
merits—artistic, representational, expressive ones—than non literary narratives.
6. Conclusion
It has been shown that knowledge acquired through narrative in argumentations can constitute basic
knowledge. The constitutive feature of this kind of knowledge is that it does not need support from
other more basic types of knowledge. Argumentation with narrative reasons is mainly a sequential
activity, as it has been explained through the so-called inferential leaf-structures. Consequently, the
argumentative goodness of a given narrative does not need to be strictly linked to its capacity to
provide basic knowledge. It can also be derived from the capacity to provide basic knowledge of the
narratives uttered previously to one.
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